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History tells us that the concentration of economic power, what US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis described as the curse of bigness, can 
be as dangerous as the concentration of political power, 
leading to social unrest and, if  the state does not react 
appropriately and in a timely manner, to the weakening 
of liberal democracies or, at worst, the outbreak of 
wars. History also tells us that at the beginning of 
each industrial revolution, economic power tends to 
concentrate among the first few firms that master the 
new technologies. Indeed today, at the dawn of the fourth 
Industrial Revolution, few big digital conglomerates 
have accumulated not just important economic but also 
informational and quasi-regulatory powers. Europe 
should be particularly worried because most of those 
conglomerates are based in the US or in China.
As competition policy is one of the most powerful tools for 
controlling the concentration of private power, it comes 
as no surprise that there is now a fierce debate among 
academics on the role of antitrust in digital economy. 
Some, the neo-Brandeisians, claim that antitrust should 
go back to its roots and be as forcefully applied against 
big tech giants as it was against the barons of the second 
Industrial Revolution. Others, the neo-Schumpeterians, 
claim that the digital economy is very competitive, with 
rival products just “one click away” and new invention 
one garage away, hence markets should be left alone. 
Many antitrust agencies across the globe have done or 
commissioned reports on the adaptation of competition 
policy to the digital era and a consensus is emerging that 
more intervention is needed.
This debate is key for competition policy as it questions its 
fundamentals, in particular its objectives and underlying 
economic theories. It also goes beyond as ex post antitrust 
intervention is often the prelude to more comprehensive 
ex ante economic regulation. To advance the debate, we 
should first identify the main characteristics of the digital 
economy and then reflect on how those characteristics 
should shape the enforcement of competition law.
The characteristics of the digital economy are many and 
different across business models and digital platforms, 
but I see at least three characteristics that are key and 
common to most digital platforms.
–  The first characteristic is the market concentration 
due to the massive direct and indirect network effects 
as well as the different data feedback loops. The 
implications of market concentration on market 
power should be assessed case-by-case because 
network and feedback effects may be balanced by 
multi-homing but, often, the first effects are stronger 
than the latter. Concentration is horizontal within 
markets but is also “conglomeral” across markets. 
Indeed, “conglomeralism” is not a bug but a feature 
of the digital economy. This can be explained by a 
combination of supply-side and demand-side effects 
which reinforce each other. On the supply side, product 
development is often based on sharable modules, like 
Lego blocks, that can be used and reused to develop 
very different products or services. For instance, the 
same dataset may be reused to develop a search engine, 
a digital map or an autonomous car. This modular 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Concurrences N° 1-2020 I Foreword I Alexandre de Streel I Should digital antitrust be ordoliberal? 3
scope and reduces the costs of expansion across 
markets. On the demand side, customers often 
value the synergies within product ecosystems. 
For instance, many Apple customers value the 
smooth and secure interoperability between 
their iMac, iPad or Apple Watch. Those 
ecosystem synergies increase the benefits of 
expansion in different markets. Economies of 
scope and ecosystem synergies are not new but 
are very much amplified in the digital economy.
–  The second characteristic of the digital economy 
is the important and rapid pace of innovation.
Most of the digital firms do not compete on
the price (and surely not on the monetary price
that is often absent) nor even on the quality of
existing products and services. They compete on 
the innovation for the next product or service
and, then, on its rapid take-up and scale up to
reap the full benefit of the network and feedback 
effects and win the whole market. This is why
the R&D spending ratio of the digital firms are
higher than the average in the economy.
–  The third main characteristic is the high level
of uncertainty of technology and market
evolution. We know that it is difficult to make
predictions, especially about the future. This
is even more difficult in the digital economy.
This is why Andy Grove, the iconic founder of
Intel, famously wrote that only the paranoids
survive or why Clayton Christensen warns
firms about the risk of disruptive innovation.
Indeed, digital innovation is not only sustaining
within the value network of the established
firms, innovation is often disruptive and takes
place outside the established value network by
introducing a different package of attributes
from the one mainstream customer historically
value.
The three main characteristics of 
the digital economy – concentration, 
innovation and unpredictability – 
should shape the enforcement of 
competition policy in the 21st century.
The relationship between those three 
characteristics are complex. On one side, the 
neo Schumpeterians claim that concentration 
is needed for innovation as it increases the 
appropriability of its benefits and, in any case, 
that innovation threat limits the market power 
effects of concentration. On the other side, 
the neo Brandeisians claim that concentration 
may slow down innovation as contestability is 
needed to stimulate it and that the concentration 
of innovation is, in any case, detrimental for 
the economy and the society. This debate, in 
particular the respective effects of appropriability 
and contestability, is very difficult to arbitrate, 
in particular when markets are unpredictable. 
However, the three main characteristics of the 
digital markets give some directions for the 
antitrust objectives, theories of harm, process 
and remedies in the 21st century.
As digital firms mainly compete in innovation, 
antitrust agencies should mainly aim at 
maintaining an “innovation level playing field” 
and ensure that a new innovator in a garage 
has the same chances as the big tech firms to 
develop and then diffuse her innovation. In other 
words, markets should remain contestable and 
contested. In addition, as the results of the digital 
innovation are often uncertain but also disruptive 
and unpredictable, agencies should look not only 
at the innovation outputs (the future products 
and services) but also at the innovation inputs—
what David Teece calls the innovation capabilities. 
Those capabilities vary across industries and 
their innovation paths. In digital, they include 
data, computing power, computing skills or risky 
and patient capital. Thus, agencies should focus 
on the firms controlling the digital innovation 
capabilities and ensure that the key capabilities 
remain available to all. More controversially, 
antitrust agencies may also want to ensure a 
certain degree of diversity in the innovation field 
as evolutionary economics shows us that diversity 
may stimulate the level and the resilience of 
innovation.
The antitrust enforcers should then focus their 
attention on corporate behaviours that try to 
unlevel the innovation field. This is the case 
when big firms foreclose or limit access to key 
innovation capabilities. This was possibly the 
strategy of Twitter when it limited access to its 
data to PeopleBrowsr. Or when big firms combine 
their large users’ base and important economies 
of scope to envelop their efficient but smaller and 
niche competitors. This may have been the strategy 
of Alphabet using Google Search to envelop the 
competitors of Google Shopping. Or when big 
firms try to identify their potential competitors 
when they are small and then, with mergers or 
acquisitions, kill them while swallowing their 
innovation. This may have been the strategy of 
Facebook when it bought WhatsApp.
To be meaningful, those antitrust interventions 
should be sufficiently quick given the rapid pace 
of innovation and the possible irreversibility of 
market tipping. There may be a trade-off  between 
the velocity and the quality of the process. 
To reduce this tension, authorities should increase 
their expertise and reduce their asymmetry of 
information vis-à-vis the digital firms. This 
is why the recent expert reports, the hiring of 
data scientists and AI experts and the increase 
transparency imposed by several new regulations, 
such as the recently adopted Platform-to-Business 
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As most digital firms compete on 
innovation, antitrust agencies should 
maintain an innovation level playing 
field.
This is also why a possible resurgence of the 
interim measures in the wake of the Broadcom 
case should be praised. In fact, the relevant EU 
rule on interim measures integrates the decision 
theory framework. Article  8 of Regulation 
1/2003 provides that antitrust enforcer should 
impose interim measures when (i) there is a risk 
of serious and irreparable harm, i.e., the costs of 
type II errors (under-enforcement) are high, and 
(ii) when there is a prima facie case of finding an 
infringement, i.e., the risks of type I errors (over-
enforcement) are low. As several recent policy 
reports have shown, the costs of type  II errors 
may be higher in the digital economy because 
of the possible irreversibility of market tipping 
while the risks of type I errors may be lower in 
the digital economy because of the high market 
concentration. So applying the legal rule, which is 
consistent with the insight of the economic theory 
under uncertainty, may lead to the imposition of 
more interim measures in the digital sector.
However, the most difficult issue for the antitrust 
enforcer is the choice of the appropriate remedies 
as the Google Shopping case illustrated. The 
choice of remedies has never been easy but 
given the rapid and unpredictable evolution 
of technology and markets as well as high 
information asymmetry between enforcers and 
firms, remedies design is particularly complex 
in the digital economy. This is probably where 
antitrust enforcers, with the support of the 
Courts, should be the most innovative. They 
could innovate in two directions. First, agencies 
may involve even more the parties, investigated 
firms and complaints alike, into the design of 
the remedies. In the same vein, Jean Tirole calls 
for a more “participatory antitrust”. Second, 
the agencies may experiment different types of 
remedies and learn by doing. There is an obvious 
tension between regulatory experimentation, 
which is necessary when uncertainty is high, and 
legal predictability, which is indispensable when 
a legal instrument is based on open norms and 
allows extensive remedies. Experimentation leads 
to long term benefits when the best solution 
is found but entails transitory costs until the 
solution is found. To reduce those transitory costs, 
experimentation may be limited to remedies which 
are behavioural (as they in general less costly 
for firms than structural remedies) and which 
have been co-designed with the parties involved. 
In any case, in the digital sector, behavioural 
access remedies are often preferable to structural 
separation remedies because the former keep the 
benefits of the economies of scope on the supply-
side and ecosystem synergies on the demand-side.
In brief, contemporary antitrust should aim 
at ensuring innovation level playing field and 
possibly diversity. Agencies should focus on 
corporate behaviours that try to unlevel the 
innovation field by foreclosing access to key 
innovation capabilities, enveloping efficient but 
smaller and niche competitors or killing young 
potential competitors while swallowing their 
innovation. Agencies should do that quickly, 
when justified by imposing interim measures. 
Moreover, they should be more participatory and 
experimental in their remedies design. 
As digital innovation is often 
unpredictable, the best objective 
for the antitrust agencies is to protect 
the competitive process. 
That leads us to a more fundamental question; 
what should be the normative framework for 
antitrust intervention in an economy that is more 
concentrated, innovative and unpredictable? 
The ordo-liberalism developed in the thirties 
by the Freiburg School as a reaction against the 
concentration of economic and political power in 
the Nazi Germany, may be a good place to start. 
Ordo-liberalism is not monolithic and has evolved 
over time but one of its main insights is the need 
to promote the competitive process and to protect 
the rivalry between firms. When competition in 
innovation is based on rivalry and future is very 
difficult to predict, it is probably better to pursue 
the competitive process as an objective in itself  
instead of focusing on the efficiency outcome. 
Uncertainty inevitably implies that competition 
authorities will make mistakes. Those should 
be minimized but, as puts by Jean Tirole, we 
should err on the side of competition. So yes, 
I  suggest that the goal of competition policy in 
the digital era should have an ordo-liberal flavour 
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